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Historians of the American West have often used the dichotomy of federal 
involvement and local exceptionalism to frame the patterns of Western history as 
well as the direction of Western historiography.  To the most famous of early 
Western historians, the West offered the truest version of what it meant to be 
American and resulted from individual efforts that yielded positive national results.  
Yet, some more recent New Western historians suggest that the conquest of the 
West evidences the worst of what it means to be American and that federal efforts 
yielded negative local results. 
 This thesis argues that the history of the Geneva plant in Orem, Utah 
illustrates a comprehensive view of the West as a confluence of federal, regional, 
and local involvement that produced dynamic situations only understood when 
considering these three powers. The history of the Geneva plant began as a response 
to federal initiatives, foundations placed by regional powers, and adaptations or 
rejections by local powers. It continued as locals refined their views of the plant and 
their relationship to larger national corporations while attempting to assimilate the 
plant and its Eastern owners.  The Geneva plant ended as the local economy 
surpassed its influence, locals grated under the polluted skies it produced, and its 
Eastern owner relinquished control to local interests that could not afford to 
continue operations much beyond the new millennia.    
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INTRODUCTION AND THESIS 
 
 
On the shores of the largest natural freshwater lake west of the Mississippi, 
there once sat a series of disjointed metal structures that for nearly six decades 
defined a valley, an economy, and helped create a perception of the American West 
(Figure 1).  Named at various times Geneva, the Geneva works, the Geneva plant, 
and Geneva Steel, these structures formed the largest integrated steel mill west of 
the Mississippi River.  First built as a means to help win the Second World War, the 
Geneva steel mill helped spur the growth of the surrounding communities of Provo 
and Orem and served as a stable force in the Utah Valley economy for nearly five 
decades.  Only later, during the 1970s and 1980s, did the Geneva plant lose some of 
its luster. No longer contributing to the economic viability of the cities it helped 
grow and making their air unusually thick during winter inversions, the Geneva 
steel mill fell silent for the last time in 2002 and disappeared from the skyline in 
2004.  While the physical form of the Geneva plant no longer exists, historians can 
benefit from the study of its origins, operation, and demise because of the unique 
mix of powers and entities that directed the path of Geneva.  The people that 
envisioned the plant and organized its construction and operation came from places 











for Geneva reflected their regional, economic, and political backgrounds. The story 
of Geneva helps historians understand the importance of understanding that 
federal, regional, and local power in the American West interact to form a unique 
human landscape that mirrors both private and state sponsored capitalism.   
The history of the Geneva plant illustrates that the complex interaction 
between federal, local, and private power defines the American West as something 
more complicated than just a ‘plundered province’ or a capitalist utopia.1 Geneva 
helps historians recognize that federal power interacted with regional power in the 
American West in a way that local entities interpreted, shaped, or sometimes 
ignored exactly because of the prevalent local conditions and attitudes.  Geneva also 
reminds historians that they cannot ignore these forces and successfully address the 
nature of the American West.  The West never functioned in a vacuum and the best 
way for historians to interpret federal involvement and local reaction is to gauge 
both sides of the story and analyze how each node of power interacted to create a 
uniquely Western result. 
This thesis argues that that the Geneva plant, from construction to 
destruction, illustrates the particularly Western mixture of federal, regional, and 
local influence, including economic and cultural processes, that defines the 
American West as a place where historical actors made choices in context of their 
place of power: local, regional, or federal.  The results of these choices, construction 
                                                          
1 See Bernard Devoto, “The West: A Plundered Province,” Harper’s Magazine CLXIX (Aug. 1934): 355-364. 
Cited in William G. Robbins, “The ‘Plundered Province’ Thesis and the Recent Historiography of the 






and operation of a large, federal industrial steel-making plant, significantly altered 
life in the agriculture-centric economy and insular society.  Utah Valley residents 
learned to accommodate the industry into their local economy and came to believe 
in the plant’s economic power far beyond the actual economic facts.  They also 
overcame their fears of outside influence and eventually claimed the plant as a local 









The historiographical context for the Geneva plant sits at the confluence of 
several historical discussions of the American West.  These include discussions of 
the nature and role of the frontier, Eastern dominance, federal involvement, and 
local dynamism. 
Frederick Jackson Turner began a lasting historical argument about the 
nature of the West when he presented “The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History” at the American Historical Association conference of 1893.  In this pivotal 
presentation, Turner argued that the American experience on the frontier defined 
America by not only changing the very nature of the people living on the frontier, 
but by shifting ever westward until 1893.  Turner eschewed the prevalent “germ” 
theory of history to present a history of America that followed the expansion of the 
nation and promoted a nationalistic self-defining process by which Europeans 
became American through their life on the frontier.  The opening of the New World, 
according to Turner, allowed European colonists to interact with “savages” and 
nature to shed their Old World baggage and traditions.  In this way, American 
history did not spring from European ancestry, but nearly came ex nihilo from the 
processes on the frontier.  Turner argued that the most emblematic frontier 
experience in American history happened in the West.  Not only did Americans then 





and taught them the values of material success, unity, and democracy.  Turner 
moved the definition of America from the cities along the Atlantic Coast to the 
Western frontier – from  Cumberland Gap to the South Pass.  This is one of the most 
important reasons  why Western historiography begins with Turner – he was the 
first to make the West essential to how historians define America.   
Historians have debated Turner’s “Frontier Thesis” from its introduction 
through the present.  Immediate contemporaries such as Charles Beard argued that 
it did not fully address the growth of cities and the influence of large immigrant 
populations.2  More modern historians have disagreed with the fundamental lack of 
diversity, its Euro-centric focus, the reliance on mythological qualities of “the West,” 
and its weakness in understanding economic factors.3  What later historians would 
call the “New Western History” either argued against Turner directly, or a few 
ignore Turner altogether.  For many decades, historiography of the West relied on 
the frontier as the defining element of the West.   
The historiographical discussion turned from frontier to Eastern dominance 
when historians began to argue that the frontier did not create America, but that 
powerful Eastern individuals and institutions used the West and its appertaining 
frontier to advance their own interests.  This new conceptualization of United States 
history not only moved the sources of change in the West to the economic and 
political centers of Eastern America, but also removed the West as the creator of 
American identity.  No longer did historians need to address the West as the best of 
                                                          
2
 Wilbur R. Jacobs, On Turner’s Trail: 100 Years of Writing Western History (Lawrence, Kansas: University 
of Kansas, 1994), 11. 
3
 Terry Bouton, “The New and (Somewhat) Improved Frontier Thesis,” Reviews in American History, 35, 





America, but could describe it as a backwater, full of the misfits and outcasts of 
American society; as something less than the center of American identity: the East.  
The best example of this change, who argued the opposite of Turner, Bernard 
DeVoto pointed out that Eastern dominance of the West defined the American West.   
In his seminal article “The West: A Plundered Province,” DeVoto made some 
of the earliest and certainly the most captivating of the arguments about the West 
and its dependency on  the East.4  A native of Utah addressing a national audience, 
DeVoto argued that “the west was born of industrialism,” and that Eastern 
businesses used that industry to dominate both Western economics and politics.5 In 
the 1934 Harper’s magazine article, DeVoto further argued that Eastern economic 
entities had changed the West’s resources into commodities and taken the profits 
for themselves.6  Beginning with the California Gold Rush, DeVoto suggested that 
Western growth sprang from industrial promoters, a “stupid” federal government, 
and the rapacious behavior of Eastern industry.7 He considered that the West would 
never achieve economic or political parity with the East because it would never 
leave its colonial status.8  Even some thirteen years later, after some of the largest 
federal expenditures in the West in history, DeVoto continued to argue that the 
West “has always been a province of the East and it has always been plundered.”9 
                                                          
4
 Bernard DeVoto, “The West: A Plundered Province,” DeVoto’s West: History, Conservation, and the 
Public Good (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2005), 34. 
5
 Ibid., 38. 
6
 Ibid., 34. 
7
 Ibid., 41. 
8
 Ibid., 41. 
9
 Bernard DeVoto, “The West Against Itself,” DeVoto’s West: History, Conservation, and the Public Good 





Some contemporaries saw DeVoto’s argument as a sympathetic and popular 
consideration of how Western radicalism was rooted in economic issues.10  Others 
believed that he enjoyed controversy and found a familiar topic with which he could 
attract attention.11  Historians who subscribe to his ‘plundered province’ thesis 
might describe the Geneva plant as a tool of Eastern exploitation. U.S. Steel 
Corporation, based in Pennsylvania, built the Geneva plant, operated the plant, and 
then purchased the plant from the federal government.  When the corporation 
threatened to close the Geneva plant in the early 1980s, employees and locals 
believed that the eastern corporation had no sympathy or connection to Western 
issues and took a profit in the short-term rather than invest in the long-term.  These 
groups argued for both greater Eastern investment and Federal involvement in steel 
trade issues, while ironically seeking to identify with a self-reliant Western ethic.  
DeVoto may have been one of the first to identify this dilemma of Western thought 
encapsulated by the effort to seek one’s own identity in the West while using 
Eastern funds to do so.  He considered this dilemma the inherent schizophrenia in 
Western thought.12  His earlier despair about the West never achieving parity with 
the East was somewhat alleviated by the amount of federal dollars invested in the 
West, but he maintained that failure was “inherent in [the West’s] psychology.”13 
While DeVoto identified a broader Eastern influence, later historians 
specifically labeled the federal government as the preeminent influence in Western 
                                                          
10
 Garrett Mattingly, Bernard DeVoto: A Preliminary Appraisal (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1938), 
51. 
11
 Orlan Sawey, Bernard DeVoto (New York: Twaney Publishers, Inc., 1969), 112. 
12
 Ibid., 118. 
13





history. These historians described the West as a place defined by federal 
government intervention.  Gerald D. Nash and Richard White, the foremost of these 
historians, have argued that federal involvement defined the West as well as 
introduced a new role for the West in American economics and society.14  Nash 
described how the Second World War changed America’s “Third World,” the West, 
from an economy of resource exploitation to a more diverse economy of industry 
and technology.15 He also asserted that changes during the Second World War 
resulted in a colony being transitioned to a region of self-sufficiency and 
innovation.16 Nash and other historians argue that although the federal government 
acted as the primary agent helping the west to ‘catch up’, private enterprise also 
played a role.17 This is another example of how historians, including Nash, have 
tried to seek the correct balance between the federal and local power when 
describing the West.  Richard White similarly argues that individuals and local 
efforts did not create the American West, but that the efforts of the federal 
government made the West a “dependency of the Federal government.”18   
Nash updates DeVoto’s ‘plundered province’ thesis to account for the 
federally induced changes in the West during the Second World War.  Nash argues 
                                                          
14
 See Gerald D. Nash, World War II and the West: Reshaping the Economy (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1990); The 
American West Transformed: The Impact of the Second World War (Bloomington, Indiana, 1985); and 
American West in the Twentieth Century: A Short History of an Urban Oasis (Albuquerque, New Mexico, 
1973). Richard White, It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the American West 
(Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 1991). 
15
 Gerald D. Nash, World War II and the West: Reshaping the Economy (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska, 1990), xii. 
16
 Gerald D. Nash, The American West Transformed: The Impact of the Second World War (Bloomington, 
Indiana: Indiana University, 1985), vii. 
17
 Nash, World War II and the West, 2. 
18
 Richard White, It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the American West 





that Eastern establishments used the West in a way that DeVoto calls ‘plundering’, 
but that the exigencies of national defense during the Second World War forced the 
federal government to intervene in the West on a scale that few private enterprises 
could achieve.19  White, on the other hand, does not argue against a foreign power 
dominating the West, he simply recognizes it as the federal government rather than 
Eastern corporations.  White acknowledges Eastern commercial interests, but 
points out that the federal government made their exploitation of the West a 
possibility. 
Some historians have argued that Nash’s thesis explains certain phenomena 
in Utah.  John Caughey argues that the federal government supplied most of the 
West’s industry and high technology enterprises during the Second World War.20 
According to Leonard Arrington and Thomas Alexander, the war economy changed 
Utah in a way that went far beyond the national average or what one could call a 
basic federal investment.21 These historians argue that the federal government 
prepared the infrastructure in Utah for expansion during the Second World War 
because Utah functioned as an extractive resource colony that provided raw 
materials for eastern industry.22  This thesis, however, argues that local and regional 
enterprises responded to not only religious forces (the early Mormon efforts to 
                                                          
19
 Gerald D. Nash, The Federal Landscape: An Economic History of the Twentieth-Century West (Tucson, 
Arizona: University of Arizona, 1999), 42. 
20
 John Caughey, The American West: Frontier and Region (Los Angeles, 1969), 21 Cited in William G. 
Robbins, “The ‘Plundered Province’ Thesis and the Recent Historiography of the American West,” Pacific 
Historical Review 55, no. 4 (1986): 577-597. 
21
 Leonard J. Arrington and Thomas G. Alexander, “Supply Hub of the West: Defense Depot Ogden, 1941-
1964,” Utah Historical Quarterly 32 (1964): 99 – 121. Cited in William G. Robbins, “The ‘Plundered 
Province’ Thesis and the Recent Historiography of the American West,” Pacific Historical Review 55, no. 4 
(1986): 581. 
22
 William G. Robbins, “The ‘Plundered Province’ Thesis and the Recent Historiography of the American 





produce pig-iron in present-day Iron County, Utah as directed by Brigham Young) 
but market forces as well (Columbia Steel’s efforts to use coal and iron ore from 
Utah mines at the Ironton plant in Provo, Utah) in order to build self-sufficiency 
from federal and Eastern industrial control.  
Other historians have rejected Nash’s arguments by suggesting that while 
historians can recognize federal government influence, they must also more fully 
study how local forces actively directed the West’s growth, development, and 
current status.  Paul Rhode, for example, objects to Nash’s thesis because it does not 
do enough to account for local economic development.  Rhode argues that internal 
dynamics dictated the results of Western development from 1900 to 1940 rather 
than federal dollars during the Second World War.23  Rhode also does not consider 
prewar California a “backward” region, as Nash described it, but a dynamic and 
progressive state that benefitted from federal dollars.24  He also argues that that the 
federal investment caused a boom period that proved unbalanced and uneven in 
application after the Second World War, suggesting that federal dollars did not 
change the entire state, but only limited parts.25   
Some scholars argue that historians have focused too much on federal and 
Eastern businesses and ignored historically significant industrial development in 
the West.  David Igler suggests that business interests in the American West 
                                                          
23
 Paul Rhode, “The Nash Thesis Revisited: An Economic Historian’s View,” Pacific Historical Review 63, no. 
3 (1993): 363-364. 
24
 Ibid., 364. 
25





fostered industry for many decades before the Second World War.26  Historians, 
specifically Nash, have ignored these decades of development, according to Igler, 
because they did not recognize the uniquely Western traits of industry. Igler 
suggests four representative traits of industry in the West. First, industrialists used 
private capital to start their industry. Second, industrialists used significant 
industrial entrepreneurship strategies that included vertical mergers, production 
chains, and subsidiaries. Third, industrialists operated their businesses in urban 
contexts with urban business networks. Fourth, industrialists engineered the 
natural landscape and labor forces to reinforce one another for greater profit.27  
While Igler’s traits specifically address industry of the 19th century, it is useful for 
historians of Western industry in the 20th century as well. 
Utah historian Thomas G. Alexander has synthesized both DeVoto and Nash 
to argue that Utah economics suffered from both an ‘old colonial empire’ and a ‘new 
colonial empire’ that essentially forced Utah’s residents to trade one colonial 
master, Wall Street, for another, Washington D.C.28  While Alexander agrees with 
Nash’s view of the transformation of economics in the Intermountain West, he 
disagrees with both Nash and Rhode to argue that transformation in Utah began in 
1933.29  Alexander argues this earlier date because it is the transition point between 
two economic systems in Utah.  The first lasted from the late 19th century to the 
                                                          
26
 David Igler, “The Industrial Far West: Region and Nation in the Late Nineteenth Century,” Pacific 
Historical Review 69, no. 2 (May, 2000): 159. 
27
 Ibid., 166-167. 
28
 Thomas G. Alexander, “Transformation of Utah: From a Colony of Wall Street to a Colony of 
Washington,” The Thetean 25 (1996): 1. 
29





Great Depression that, though dominated by Wall Street and inconsistent in success, 
worked relatively well for nearly fifty years.30   
DeVoto and Webb blamed plundering of eastern colonialists and the demise 
of the western frontier for the West’s distress, but Alexander places the blame firmly 
on the collapse of the ‘old colonial empire’.  The ‘new colonial empire’, according to 
Alexander, came from investments and interventions brought by federal agencies at 
the direction of people in Washington D.C starting in 1933.  Alexander argues that 
these federal construction projects, loans, and direct interventions forever changed 
Utah.  Unlike Nash who argues World War II as the overthrow of colonialism, 
Alexander perceives it as the second step, and crucial linchpin, of the ‘new colonial 
empire.’  For the purposes of this thesis, Alexander’s arguments hold mostly true.  
While the DPC did not start Geneva until nine years after his 1933 transition point, 
Geneva most definitely came from federal intervention.  The problem, however, lies 
in the fact that the Federal government sold the property to a private corporation – 
one that clearly fits Alexander’s description of the ‘old colonial empire’ of Wall 
Street.  Other federal facilities in Utah, particularly Hill Air Force Base, remain in 
federal hands, but the Geneva plant moved back to Wall Street.  While the fortunes 
of most of Utah “rose and fell with Washington and the military,” employees of 
Geneva were bound to an Eastern Corporation that they felt, in the end, betrayed 
them.31  Though this thesis does not argue that Utah was a colony, it is important to 
analyze and trace the lines of power from the Geneva plant in Orem to Washington 
D.C., Pittsburgh, and Salt Lake City. 
                                                          
30
 Ibid., 6. 
31





 “New” Western historians argue that federal projects, such as the 
construction of the Geneva plant, represent a continuation of the conquest or 
domination of the West, either by federal forces or by regional/national business 
interests.32  “New” Western historians, wanted to move the discussion of Western 
history away from the mythological place and frontier process theses to a more 
grounded place thesis that did not ignore under-represented groups or the federal 
influence on the West.  Where Turner and DeVoto may have primarily addressed 
Anglo-American settlement, expansion, and economics, “New” Western historians 
explained the West of Native Americans, other minority groups, and women.  The 
fundamental terms of discussion in “New” Western historiography reflect these 
changes: Patricia Limerick describes the “conquest” of the West in terms of violence, 
control, and domination.  Contemporaries of Turner might have advocated Turner’s 
frontier thesis using the term conquest, but not in the sense that Limerick uses it.  
Turner’s frontier thesis argues for the conquest of savages by the Europeans who in 
turn, through this conquest, become American.   
While this thesis does argue that federal officials needed to collaborate with 
executives from a national corporation to succeed in building and operating the 
Geneva plant, it strongly suggests that regional and local dynamics are a third factor 
crucial to our understanding of the Geneva plant and the West.  Previous efforts by 
local and regional enterprise deserve more credit for the opportunity and impetus 
for the construction of the Geneva plant.  Nash argued implicitly and explicitly that 
                                                          
32
 See Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New 
York, 1987) and Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West 





the West had to catch up with the rest of the nation during the Second World War 
and that it was nearly a tabula rasa, with no significant industry and little economic 
development.33  As this thesis shows, however, federal officials could not have made 
their choice to build in Utah if previous local and regional private entities had not 
made significant progress in steel making using Utah resources.  Mormon pioneers 
first explored the iron-ore and coal in Utah for economic purposes and attempted to 
use them to achieve industrial independence from the East.  In 1917, the Utah Steel 
Company built a steel plant near Midvale, Utah that failed just four years later in 
1921.34  A regional company, Columbia Steel Company based in California 
(purchased by the national U.S. Steel Corporation in 1930), built an iron plant at 
Ironton, Utah in 1920.  This plant developed essential techniques for using Utah coal 
in the iron making process.  Without this foundational work, federal employees may 
have looked elsewhere in the West.  
The human and environmental contexts of the Geneva plant help historians 
frame the connection between federal, regional, and local.  The resources developed 
by regional industry, including the coal reserves near Price, the iron reserves near 
Cedar City, and the water in Provo River and Utah Lake, influenced the federal 
decision to build in Utah.  In addition, the human environmental landscape of 
railroads, dams, mines, and cities help us understand that the federal government 
and local powers considered the local infrastructure sufficient to warrant significant 
investment.  Studying the historical context helps historians ascribe the existence of 
the Geneva plant to more than federal involvement or a traditional capitalist 
                                                          
33
 Nash, The American West Transformed, v. 
34





venture. Local industrialists did not operate the Geneva plant as a free standing 
commercial enterprise for the purposes of profit.  Rather, locals and private entities 
adapted to a federal project that federal employees researched and federal dollars 
funded.  The federal efforts also had to adapt to a project that employed local labor, 
used local resources, and hired an employee of an Eastern company, Walter 
Mathesius, to operate the plant and find a way to satisfy the local powers.35   
 
                                                          
35
 “Dr. Walther Mathesius – Father of Geneva Steel,” Brigham Young University L Tom Perry Special 
Collections, MSS 3122, Box 1, Folder 2.  J. Reuben Clark, a member of the First Presidency, a governing 
body of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, described Mathesius: “You have a very remarkable 
man in charge of operations at Geneva. It is hard for a man to come among us and understand.  He is one 
of the few that has come among us that has tried to learn and did.  We are most delighted to know that 





THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN STEEL 
 
 
 The Geneva plant resulted from both local and federal deliberations on steel 
production in the West during the buildup to the Second World War.  The first 
proposals for an integrated steel plant west of the Mississippi River began with a 
private citizen rather than a federal directive when early in 1941, Henry J. Kaiser, an 
industrialist based in California, proposed an integrated steel company on the 
Pacific Coast.  He suggested that the steel company would address the shortage of 
steel in the region.36  Kaiser had already received a $9.25 million government loan 
to build a magnesium reduction plant worth nearly $12 million, near San 
Francisco.37 His integrated steel mill plan had three parts: a pig iron plant at Mount 
Pleasant, Utah, a steel mill near Bonneville Dam using hydroelectric power to mill 
scrap steel, and a steel mill in southern California that would use the pig iron 
produced in Mount Pleasant.38 Kaiser wanted to build the steel production facilities 
using federal government loans rather than private capital and operate the plant 
using his own corporation.  His choice to use a loan for his already operating 
magnesium plant and a new steel company reinforces the concept of interaction 
between private and federal power in the West.  Kaiser may have had the money to 
                                                          
36
 “Proposes Building Coast Steel Plant,” New York Times, 23 Apr 1941, 16. 
37
 Ibid., 16. 
38





build a steel company, but may have sought federal aid as a way to make his efforts 
more secure and more profitable. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt exerted the first direct federal powers to 
build the Geneva plant by tasking the OPM with a study of Kaiser’s proposal and 
steel production issues in the West.39  The OPM’s charter goals were to manage the 
production of materials and plant facilities in order to maximize their contribution 
to national defense production.40 The investigation, planning, and construction of 
new steel plants were within the scope of this executive order.   Soon after the press 
conference, the OPM sent one of its steel capacity consultants, W. A. Hauck, to the 
west coast to investigate and develop plans to increase steel deliveries to the West.41  
Staff at the OPM worried that that defense program on the Pacific coast, especially in 
shipbuilding, would use more steel than Eastern plants could produce or, more 
importantly, deliver.  Gano Dunn, a senior production consultant for the OPM, had 
previously reported to President Roosevelt that American industry produced 
sufficient steel for the near future.  After learning of Hauck’s report, Dunn revised 
his report and recommended increased steel production and output.42  
Federal demands and federal dollars mixed with regional business to change 
the industrial landscape of the West when steel demand increased dramatically due 
to a substantial federal steel production program.  Private enterprises across the 
country had increased their steel production during the years prior to the Second 
                                                          
39
 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order 8629 on the Office of Production Management and the Office for 
Emergency Management, Jan 7, 1941. And New York Times “Proposes Building,” 16. 
40
 Roosevelt, Executive Order 8629. 
41
 Deseret News, “Steel Mill Proposed,” 3. 
42





World War.  Early in 1941 the officials at Columbia Steel Company, a San Francisco 
based subsidiary of the United States Steel Corporation, explained that they planned 
on expanding their steel production facilities by $5 million.43 This included 
Columbia Steel Company’s facilities in Utah consisting of iron ore mines, coal mines, 
and blast furnaces at Ironton that produced pig iron.44 Columbia Steel’s decision 
came in response to their recognition of increased steel demand due to the national 
defense program and other steel users.45  That impetus changed as the year 
progressed and as the Second World War began because federal demand for steel 
would skyrocket and become the essential cause for expansion.   
In the summer of 1941, Hauck and Dunn returned to Washington, D.C. and 
submitted their report to the OPM suggesting that the steel industry would need to 
expand production capacity by nearly one and a half million tons.46  Hauck and Dunn 
considered the increase necessary due to the strategic value of steel and the lack of 
production capability in the West.47  By June, seven private companies had 
responded to the federal invitation with plans, all of which asked for the 
government to provide nearly all the funds for expansion.  These companies 
included Columbia Steel Company, which submitted the largest bid, the Colorado 
Fuel and Iron Corporation, and the Bethlehem Steel Company.  The OPM continued 
to consider Henry J. Kaiser’s suggestion of a new integrated steel mill but none of 
the other projects included new facilities.  Columbia Steel’s proposal included an 
                                                          
43













expansion of their Ironton facilities at a cost of over fifty-seven million dollars.48  
This proposal, a response of a private regional Western company to a federal 
request to increase steel production, eventually became the Geneva plant. 
Officials at the OPM chose to expand steel production in the West because of 
national security issues related to the delivery and use of steel on the Pacific Coast.  
The officials at the OPM, however, did not prioritize the improvement of Western 
private enterprise or regional development of Western industry.  Some 
contemporary papers characterized the federal expansion of steel production as a 
planned effort to put the West on equal terms with the East and make Western 
industry independent of Eastern steel mills.49  Federal officials like Hauck, however, 
viewed the closure of maritime shipping lanes and the Panama Canal as the primary 
strategic reasons for Western steel production.  Other papers realized that if the U.S. 
government ever closed the Panama Canal, either for safety or due to attack, 
demand for steel in Western defense programs and in railroad use would 
overwhelm ground transportation and create a steel transportation bottleneck that 
would significantly hamper defense operations on the west coast.50  Walther 
Mathesius, president of the Columbia-Geneva Steel Company from 1943 to 1946 and 
the Geneva Steel Company from 1946 to 1951, agreed with Hauck’s assessment 
relating in 1951 that the iron and steel industry in Utah developed further because 
of the federal concerns of a possible closure of the Panama Canal.51  This argument 
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strongly suggests that the federal government would have never invested in 
Western steel production had it not been for the strategic implications of the 
Panama Canal during the Second World War.  The officials at the OPM did not aim to 
foster regional industry or to bring the American West out of the third world and 
into the first; they simply wanted to address national defense contingencies and the 
supply and demand issues that loomed ahead of the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Even with the focus on developing Western steel capacity, federal expansion 
fell unevenly on the country.  As 1941 progressed, OPM officials again found 
expectations of expansion too small and increased the target amount for steel 
production.  The staff at the OPM rushed the existing projects to Federal financing 
agencies.  Hauck estimated the cost of expanding production to ten million tons of 
steel at one and a quarter billion dollars and that a fifteen million ton program 
would cost at least two billion dollars.52  Hauck also estimated that nearly fifty 
thousand men would be required to build the mills needed for expansion.53  The 
plan called for new plants in Los Angeles and Pittsburgh, California and Provo, Utah.  
Tellingly, of the over thirteen million expansion tonnage planned, Pennsylvania 
would receive over five million tons, Ohio nearly two million tons, Indiana just more 
than one million, and New York would receive over half a million tons of production.  
Thus, the vast majority of steel production expansion would still remain in the East 
and just over one-third would expand to the West. 
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REGIONAL AND LOCAL FACTORS 
 
 
When the OPM officials recommended a further expansion of Western steel 
production in 1941, they relied on infrastructure and development already in place 
due to efforts of regional Western industries.   The federal government chose Utah 
for a steel plant because local factors made it possible, effective, and beneficial to the 
national war effort.  The region had easy access to the necessary raw materials, a 
proven record of using those materials for pig iron production, and the railroad 
lines necessary for reliable and expeditious export of the finished materials to the 
pacific coast shipyards.  Mathesius considered Columbia Steel’s development of pig 
iron from the coal and iron ores of Utah essential to the federal choice of Utah for a 
steel mill. The efforts of the privately owned, independently operated, and Western-
based Columbia Steel Company in 1922 allowed employees at Columbia Steel 
Company to used Western resources to produce Western products.  They were 
successful, but not without some serious effort and innovation.  According to 
Mathesius, processed Utah coal yielded coke below the standards of Eastern 
industry. 54  Experimental work done by Columbia Steel staff created an 
improvement in quality that allowed pig iron production to succeed in Utah.   
Mathesius credited the Ironton plant for paving the way for the Geneva plant 
to use Utah coal and iron ore, but he also considered several other materials used in 
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steel production essential to the federal choice. 55  These include coal from deposits 
west of Price, iron ore deposits near Cedar City, limestone and dolomite from 
quarries in Payson, Utah, foundry sand from southern Utah, fluorspar from a 
location some forty-five miles northwest of Delta, Utah, and blast furnace runners 
from vestigial Lake Bonneville sand just a few miles from Geneva.  The Geneva plant 
used clay that did not originate in Utah.  According to Mathesius, Utah clays were 
either too full of impurities or had too much alkaline in them for effective steel 
production use.56  Easy access to water also brought a steel plant to Utah and 
Geneva.  Mathesius noted that the public may have overlooked water use in 
industry, but the operation of a steel plant in Utah made water essential.  He 
believed modern steel plants needed to use water efficiently and in long-term 
partnerships with private, municipality, state, and federal water entities.57 
Part of the expansion in the earlier Columbia Steel proposal for fifty-seven 
million dollars included a thirty-five million dollar plant in Provo, Utah.  Columbia 
Steel originally considered this project an expansion of the Ironton facilities.58  Utah 
County representatives gathered in the City and County Building in Provo to make a 
unified front to put the proposed Columbia Steel Company pig iron plant in Utah 
County.59 The representatives at the meeting noted that because Utah County 
already had a blast furnace in operation at Ironton, increasing pig iron production 















would be more effective and cost efficient in Utah Valley.60  While the committee 
favored expansion of the Ironton facilities, they did allow that three other locations 
could be acceptable: an abandoned sugar factory in Lehi, an unspecified location 
between Springville and Spanish Fork, and Geneva on Utah Lake.61  John E. booth, 
mayor of Spanish Fork and chairman of the site committee later detailed the 
specifics benefits of each location: the Lehi plant had an abundance of water and 
two main railroad lines; the Geneva resort had lake water, a spring with production 
of from ten to fifteen cubic feet of water per second, and two railroad lines nearby; 
the Ironton plant which had more than 600 acres available for development 
including four railroad lines; and finally the Springville-Mapleton Sugar Company’s 
abandoned factory which had plenty of land, water, and three railroads.62  The local 
infrastructure empowered the federal government to make a successful choice 
because of the location of water, rails, and land.   
Local powers in Utah County attempted to both facilitate and benefit from 
federal use of power.  They were not a colony that accepted federal choice and 
watched powerlessly and they were not capitalists who spent their own capital to 
build the plant.  Various elements of Utah County’s communities tried to renovate 
and prepare the manmade environment for the arrival of a large iron and steel 
plant.  A.V. Watkins, the general counsel for the Provo River Water-Users 
Association, attempted to secure a priority rating for the Deer Creek Project because 
additional water and power would be necessary once the project for the Geneva 











plant began.63  Others were working to plan the expansion of infrastructure, 
including streets, sidewalks, buildings, and other improvements, to address the 
expected growth of construction workers and employees.64  Business leaders were 
very excited about the news because they expected the plant to produce an 
economic and population boom in the valley.65  Dick Anderson, president of the local 
Labor Union of North America, noted that his chapter, formed in 1938, went from a 
few members to nearly 2,000 when newspapers announced Geneva and 
construction crews broke ground on the plant.66 
 Choices made by federal, regional, and local powers created the vision, 
design, and construction of an integrated steel plant in Utah Valley.  Officials at 
federal agencies worried that steel production in the West could not satisfy national 
defense needs, especially if authorities closed the Panama Canal.  Management at 
regional industries used earlier investments in technology and manpower to 
suggest that an integrated steel mill could succeed while using resources found in 
Utah.  Local businessmen and politicians tried to both support and steer federal 
decisions by suggesting locations, adapting local infrastructure, and attempting to 
sway public opinion. The decision to build an integrated steel mill in Utah forced 
federal, regional, and local entities to engage each other and achieve a unique 
balance of state directed economy and private innovation that typifies the American 
West.  Private industry had discovered a better way to work with the natural 
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resources of Utah in order to make a profit from Western resources.  This allowed 
the federal government to use Utah as a staging ground for increased steel 
production to support national defense efforts and later a national war effort.  Local 
citizens groups both accepted and used the federal choice of Utah to further the 
government’s agenda and make a profit of their own.  Neither the federal 







CONSTRUCTION AND WARTIME OPERATION 
 
OF THE GENEVA PLANT 
 
 
The construction and operation of the Geneva plant continues the example of 
the balance between federal and private that allowed the West to function and 
develop as a vital blend between national, regional, and local, federal and private, 
Western and Eastern.  The federal government funded construction and operation 
of the Geneva plant while a private entity, U.S. Steel, operated the plant.  During 
construction and wartime operation, both the federal government and U.S. Steel 
could not have succeeded without each other or without prior efforts by local 
entities.  
The OPM staff announced the contract to build the Geneva plant on Nov 26, 
1941, less than two weeks before the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Jesse Jones explained 
that the DPC had authorized a ninety million dollar contract with Columbia Steel 
Company to build the integrated steel mill facilities at Geneva, Utah and that it 
would produce pig iron, steel ingots, and structural steel.67  A 1945 report by the 
Arthur G. McKee & Company engineering firm placed the total cost at 134 million 
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dollars.68  Mathesius recorded that the production ratings came to 1,150,00 net tons 
of pig iron, and 1,283,400 net tons of steel ingots – a significant increase for Western 
steel production and larger than the total steel plant production at Kaiser’s Fontana 
steel plant in California.69 
Construction of the Geneva plant lasted from November, 1941 to December, 
1944 (Figure 2).70 Columbia Steel, a subsidiary of U.S. Steel since 1930, built the 
plant for the DPC and operated it without fee or profit.71  Arthur McKee & Company 
noted that Geneva became the largest integrated steel plant built in the United 
States during the war and one of the nation’s largest steel plants.72  At the peak of 
construction more than 7,000 men worked on the project.73  Nearly an eighth of 
what Hauck estimated for all American steel industry construction jobs worked at 
the Geneva plant.74 In 1941 and 1942, Columbia Steel built thirty barracks housing 
one hundred men each.   
Columbia Steel employees continued construction on infrastructure needs 
and accessory plants.  Columbia Steel employees started the Geneva Coal Mine, 
located in Emery County, Utah and production began in October of 1942.  They also 
completed the six and half mile railroad spur to the coal mine in sixty days and used  
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movable camps like those used in construction of the Alaska Highway.75  At the 
Geneva plant, Columbia Steel officials tried to avoid drawing on agricultural water 
by using local artesian wells and Deer Creek reservoir water carried by pipeline to 
the plant property.  The water system also included a reservoir covering 310 acres 
for collection and storage purposes that benefited local agricultural production 
through greater water access.76  The Geneva plant required approximately seventy 
miles of spur track on its grounds.77  The order of construction and operation in the 
actual steel mill began with the power plant, coke plant, the first of three blast 
furnaces, and then the open hearth furnace.  Some of the earliest products were pig 
iron and coke by-products which include gas, tar, benzene, naphthalene, and other 
products.78   
Steel shortages in early 1942 validated the DPC and Kaiser’s efforts to boost 
steel production at integrated steel mills like Geneva.  Shortages of steel ingots 
shipped to nonintegrated steel mills slowed work and hindered production of vital 
war products.79  In February, 1942 some of the media wondered whether there 
would be enough raw materials to supply all the steel production expansion.80  
Henry Kaiser recognized the problem and called steel the bottleneck of American 
war production and essential to the war effort.81  His plant at Fontana, California, 
however, would use Western resources to create steel products, just like the Geneva 
plant, and would not increase the demand on existing steel ingot production.  He 
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argued that there were millions of tons of ore in the West and that his mills in the 
West were going to use it.82  Kaiser did not have to wait long as the Fontana plant 
began operations on December 30th, 1942.  The first integrated steel mill west of the 
Rockies, Fontana produced 675,000 tons of steel ingots in its open hearth furnaces 
while its rolling mill could produce 300,000 tons of ship plate annually.83 
While Kaiser was able to use federal loans to build his mill, federal efforts to 
build and operate the Geneva plant relied on a national corporation and the 
president of its subsidiary who had to work with local powers to secure community 
good will and success.  U.S. Steel executives formed a new subsidiary called Geneva 
Steel Company on August 20, 1943 and signed a contract to manage and operate the 
Geneva plant for the federal government without profit.  The first president of the 
Geneva Steel Company, Walther Mathesius, arrived in Salt Lake City on October 4, 
1943 to begin his duties.84  Prior to his appointment as President and a director of 
Geneva Steel Company, Mathesius had taken an active part in planning and building 
the plant.85   
Mathesius wanted to make the plant fully operational, and to do that he 
needed two things: the proper facilities and the proper relationship with the local 
people.86  While construction workers were making excellent progress on the 
facilities, Mathesius accepted the responsibility to influence the local population as 
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best he could.  Mathesius reflected that Salt Lake City and Utah still had a ‘frontier 
atmosphere’ that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints dominated in 
religious, economic, and business matters.87  Mathesius described his job of working 
to secure local favor as a delicate task to convince LDS leadership that industrial 
development would add to the state’s economic prosperity and would be achievable 
“without threatening their agricultural pursuits or their organization’s control over 
their people.”88 Even Jesse Jones lauded Mathesius and the community for 
cooperating in a venture that changed the state’s entire economy.89 Local 
entrepreneur and industrialist, Joseph Rosenblatt, regarded Mathesius, with whom 
he dined often, a capable steel man who knew his business well, knew the needs of 
an efficient plant, knew how to work with people, and knew how to be a 
disciplinarian.90  Rosenblatt said that Mathesius expected respect and got it and by 
reason of his character he became a leader in the community.91 
Initially, the local population experienced “widespread apprehension” based 
on the fear that the introduction of a large industrial enterprise might result in the 
influx of many workers from outside the state.92  People feared that these new 
employees might live at variance with the established way of life described as 
“peaceful” and as an “honored social and cultural ethic inherited from Utah’s 
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pioneers and cherished by each succeeding generation of Utahns.”93  In addition, 
some questioned whether Brigham Young University could co-exist with such a 
large industrial enterprise that might interrupt the “serene culture of a church-
endowed institute of higher learning.”94  Mathesius held public relations meetings 
and speeches to reassure locals that agricultural and industrial interests could 
mingle successfully and that the Geneva plant need not be feared. 
The mix of local and out-of-state workers raised some issues about the 
inclusiveness of Utah County residents and local attitudes.  Most of the local 
construction workers were men of primarily European heritage, but other out-of-
state workers included African American men brought to Utah County specifically to 
work on Geneva.  Some of the men encountered racist attitudes.  This included an 
incident recounted by Dick Anderson where an African American construction 
worker decried the racist treatment he received even though he was veteran.  He 
showed Anderson a wound received during service in World War II.  The man then 
said to Anderson that “I can cut off my finger and my blood would run down that 
table just the same as yours. But yet, I can’t spend a U.S. dollar in your store up here.  
Two clerks walked away and left me standing there. Tell me why?”95  While 
Anderson suggested that the Union he presided over showed no discrimination to 
African Americans, he admitted that “it was a little rough for the colored people 
here, but they came here and they were needed here.”96  Anderson recalled how 
some Colombia Steel construction managers suggested finding workers among the 
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Japanese-Americans held at the internment camp near Topaz.  Anderson feared that 
such workers would face retaliatory violence and his union voted unanimously 
against the idea.97  These narratives reveal that racial attitudes in 1940s Utah were 
not much different from those prevalent throughout America.  Although the local 
residents would come to accept most employees of the Geneva plant as integral 
parts of the cultural fabric and economy of the area, minority employees would 
struggle with acceptance until and even beyond the time the effects of the Civil 
Rights movement made their way to Utah. 
Unlike many local residents, many business leaders and state politicians 
feared that operations at the Geneva plant would end after the war and that the local 
economic boom would go bust.  Some of the local powers tried to sway business and 
public opinion to view the existence of the Geneva plant as a positive thing and rally 
them to envision a future with an operational postwar Geneva plant.  Clayton 
Jenkins, the secretary of the Provo Chamber of Commerce, wrote in the Deseret 
News that the Geneva plant would drastically alter the nature of Provo after the 
war.98  In an exuberant turn, Jenkins wrote that the Geneva plant, even if operated at 
sixty or eighty percent capacity would solve all the job problems in the county and 
the entire state.99  Jenkins efforts to minimize fear focused on the postwar 
operations of the plant.  In comparison, Mathesius began operations at the plant on 
the strict guidelines that the federal government made the plant for the war effort 
and that postwar speculation was immaterial to war time operations.  Jenkins 











drummed up support by arguing that the citizens of Utah County had confidence 
that after the war, Geneva Steel would continue to operate and provide jobs “for all 
our soldier boys and for others who need them.”100 
Regional business and political interests also feared the closure of the Geneva 
plant and campaigned for it to remain in operation after the war so that the West 
could have a larger share of economic independence.  According to the Deseret News, 
Utah representatives to a Western regional conference in Los Angeles argued that 
the Geneva plant had to stay in operation to expand an industry already using 
Western resources to serve the economic needs of the people in the West.101  The 
conference found that the Geneva and Fontana plants could both operate if rail 
operators based the cost of steel shipments in the West on the production cost at 
Geneva and Fontana.  Kenneth Norris, chairman of the Los Angeles Chamber of 
Commerce steel committee, demanded federal government action that would insure 
postwar operation of both plants.102  The committee adopted recommendations that 
encouraged lower priced steel, transfer of the mills to private operation with 
statements of price policies, that fair value determination of the Geneva plant should 
also determine the debt burden of the Fontana plant (something championed by 
Henry Kaiser), and that prices on freight must be matched to Western production 
costs rather than Eastern production and freight (phantom or real, according to the 
committee). 103  The Arthur G. McKee & Company report suggested that the general 
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location of Geneva Steel would be excellent for postwar commercial use of Utah’s 
raw materials and that geography protected Utah exceptionally well from military 
actions.104 Writers at local papers worried that the perceived Western inferiority to 
Eastern industrial power would force the West to again “take what manufactured 
goods the East offered – at prices set by the East.”105  The two best results of the 
effort, according to Western industry proponents, were the Fontana and Geneva 
plants.”106  Echoing ideas similar to Mathesius’ comments to the Payson Chamber of 
Commerce, these writers argued that since the eleven western states had half of the 
nation’s coal reserves and tremendous iron-ore reserves, the West also ought to 
have a large proportion of the nation’s steel production.107   
Fears of postwar closure increased in local business leader’s and politician’s 
minds when the War Production Board discontinued the Geneva structural steel 
unit in early 1944.  The War Production Board ordered work on the structural steel 
unit stopped because of oversupply in structural steel parts.108  This action 
encouraged the Deseret News to report that the plant threatened to become a 
national problem.109  Governor Herbert Maw and the Utah Senators appealed to the 
WPB, but failed to convince them to restart construction – neither the RFC nor the 
Defense Plant Board had the power to circumvent the WPB order, only President 
Roosevelt could rescind such an order.110  The Deseret News reported that the 
Governor and Senators expressed concern about the survival of Geneva Steel and 
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the steel industry in Utah after the war.  Others concerned about the postwar status 
of Geneva Steel included the Chamber of Commerce in Utah County and other civic 
leaders.  The Deseret News reported that city and county officials and leaders of 
business and the Chamber of Commerce in the Utah County area held a meeting (the 
Deseret News assumed that Geneva representatives were in attendance), “and that at 
this meeting the committee passed a resolution asking the Deseret News to ‘refrain 
from printing rumor and propaganda adverse to the steel plant.’”111  The Chamber of 
Commerce committee argued that the Deseret News had tried to put obstacles in the 
way of the plant that might threaten postwar operations.  According to the Deseret 
News, the WPB’s order was secret, and that by printing the order, the public reaction 
and concern might help the WPB to change its mind and renew the work, rather 
than having the mill “dismantled and shipped away to Russia or someplace else.”112 
Mathesius tried to reassure business and political leaders while defending 
the wartime role of the plant.  Mathesius wrote that Geneva Steel always 
appreciated cooperation of the public including discussions, publications, and other 
conversation about the plant and that Geneva Steel insisted on news and facts that 
“represent the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.”113  Mathesius 
regretted that publication of the stop order on the structural mill had resulted in 
decreased employment applications.  He also argued that the people of Utah and the 
West would have to cooperate if they wanted to see Geneva Steel continue to 
operate after the war.  The postwar status of the Geneva facilities caused a stir in 
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politics, economics, and cultural life, and it had not even begun producing steel for 
more than a few months.  While Mathesius refused to speculate officially about the 
postwar outlook for the Geneva plant, he did suggest that there should be some 
opportunity for postwar operations.114  He also pointed out that the full-scale 
operations would depend on the shifting needs of the war program and the time 
when essential materials would be furnished.  He noted that DPC policies disallowed 
it from competing in the private market.  For war time operations, Mathesius said, 
U.S. Steel did not design Geneva Steel Corporation to address any economic, 
employment, social, or political needs of Utah County or even Utah, but solely for the 
ongoing war effort and national steel production issues.115  
The possibility of keeping the Geneva plant in operation postwar and the 
nature of the operations and ownership inspired questions about the fate of the 
plant and its excess steel capacity after the war ended.  Some wondered whether the 
plant would continue as a federal entity or whether the federal government would 
sell it to private industry.  Jesse Jones confirmed that the RFC would convert all of 
the federal facilities to civilian production because he considered that the less often 
the government built plants, the better it would be for the industry when the war 
ended.116  Jones also said that he would have preferred to have private industry 
build the plants, but that they were reluctant to do so. 117  The New York Times 
estimated that war time production of steel would reach its capacity in late 1944 for 
a total of approximately one hundred million tons, or twice that of the rest of the 
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world combined.118 Jones did not consider excess steel production a problem for the 
U.S. economy but he did express concern that demand for steel would not keep up 
with production and that some cannibalism of steel mills in the United States would 
be inevitable. 119 
 Local discussion of privatization at the Geneva plant took on more urgency as 
wartime orders began to slow and production stopped.  Predictions by some that 
the Geneva Steel Plant would run out of government orders by the fall of 1945 were 
given more credence when Walther Mathesius announced a partial shutdown as 
ordered by the DPC and the WPB. 120  Mathesius explained that victory in Europe 
had greatly diminished the government’s needs for structural shapes.121 Utah 
Senator Abe Murdock reacted to the news of the partial closure by arguing that 
there could be no question but that Geneva Steel would survive as a peacetime 
industry.  “The only question is who will operate it,” he said.122  Murdock put a 
positive spin on the closures by saying that “No one wants to continue a world war 
to make it possible to operate Geneva.  We want the plant to bring steel to the west 
to unite with our other raw materials in building peacetime industry and wealth.”123  
He continued to suggest that Utah representatives, in cooperation with other states, 
were working to secure a specific plan with which the Geneva plant would be 
offered for sale to a private enterprise.124   
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When the federal government closed the Geneva plant in 1946, it officially 
produced its last wartime steel on Oct. 12, 1945, conversion to civilian production 
became a substantial question.125  As a result of reduction in government orders, 
employment at the Geneva plant dropped significantly from November 1944 to a 
new low in March of 1946.126  Only one coke oven and one blast furnace were in 
stand-by operation in January 1946.127  Although most employees were dismissed, 
some maintenance crews remained and a few engineers stayed on.128  Mathesius 
estimated that conversion of the structural mill to peacetime operations would take 
six to eight weeks, if all the materials and equipment were available.  He also said 
that the plate mill conversion would take approximately one year.  Mathesius 
believed that it would take three months to resume full operation although a 
complete changeover to civilian production (including changes to hot rolled strip 
and coils) would take approximately a year.129  The Deseret News estimated that 
changing to peacetime operations would cost $40,000,000.130  Mathesius expressed 
concern that the plant would close permanently; he wanted it to continue 
operations.  He did not, however, expect to continue as president.131 He wrote that 
he had been grateful to make a sizeable contribution to the war production effort 
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and that the company did not regret that “the earlier than anticipated collapse of 
Japan shortened the steel production program at Geneva.”132 
 







PRIVATIZATION OF THE GENEVA PLANT 
 
 
A strict interpretation of historical arguments about federal involvement 
might suggest that the federal government would have continued to operate the 
Geneva plant after World War II for national projects, national profit, and national 
pride.  It also would suggest that rather than retreat from influence, the federal 
government would have seized the opportunity to control more of the economic 
destiny of Utah.  The actual result, however, suggests that the federal government 
did not want to dominate the West, but simply wanted to address national defense 
needs of steel supply in the West and then take the opportunity to divest itself of no 
longer needed facilities.  This change to private hands, especially since the plant 
ended up in an Eastern corporation, more closely aligns with DeVoto’s thoughts 
about Eastern influence than federal theories.  To complicate matters, however, 
when officials at the OPM chose Utah Valley for a steel plant, they depended on 
regional and local resources to make the realization of the plant possible.  That the 
federal government involved itself in the American West is without question.  Nash, 
White, and other authors do not argue that regional and local powers were non-
existent; however, they spend too little time recognizing what development already 
existed in the West and how vital it was to any Federal involvement.  For the plant at 
Geneva, direct federal involvement ended in 1946 even though in later decades 





competition.  Regional and local powers modified the indelible imprint of federal 
action in the American West through efforts that, even after federal involvement 
ended, continued to shape the West according to pre-existing regional and local 
values. 
 The DPC offered the Geneva plant for auction and expected bids by April 1, 
1946.133  If the plant had not sold at that time, the responsibilities of U.S. Steel would 
have ended July 12, 1946.134  The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette described the Geneva steel 
mill “the No. 1 problem child of surplus property disposal.”135  Three companies, 
Kaiser Steel, U.S. Steel, and Colorado Fuel and Iron, were the first to express 
legitimate interest in purchasing the plant from the DPC.136 Henry Kaiser announced 
a bid on the Geneva steel plant and his idea to use it as a cornerstone for a “vast 
western steel empire.”137  According to the Deseret News, Kaiser pictured the Geneva 
plant as part of a larger steel empire in the American West.138  He also proposed 
spending seven million dollars to modify the existing plant so that it could roll hot 
strip – a semifinished steel product.139  U.S. Steel Corporation and Colorado Fuel and 
Iron had informed the DPC of their interest and plan to submit proposals for sale or 
lease terms.  Although U.S. Steel had offered to purchase the plant in the summer of 
1945 and had bowed out due to political attacks, Mathesius reported that those who 
had opposed the purchase had either been “removed from their positions or 
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withdrawn their statements.”140  The memorandum offering the plant for sale was 
distributed as widely as possible so that, as John O’Brien, Brigadier General of the 
U.S. Army and Director of the Office of Real Property Disposal explained, such an 
important plant, with effects on the economy of the nation and the West, would be 
adequately handled.141 
 On May 1, 1946, one month after the April deadline, the War Assets 
Corporation opened the sealed bids for the Geneva steel plant.142  The bid prices 
ranged from $38.75 million to over $222 million and included bids from seven 
entities including Riley Steel Company of Los Angeles, United States Steel 
Corporation in behalf of the Geneva Steel Company, and some other apparently 
fictitious companies.143  U.S. Steel offered to pay $40 million for the plant and $7.5 
million for the inventory in addition to promising at least $42 million in upgrades to 
production facilities.144  U.S. Steel’s offer came in significantly under the original 
plant value of around $191 million.145  The Kaiser Company, Inc., of Oakland, 
California, who had expressed interest in the Geneva facilities, did not participate in 
the bidding process.  The New York Times reported that instead of making an offer, 
Kaiser demanded that the debt on the Fontana plant, built with federal loan money, 
be adjusted to the price arranged for the Geneva plant.146  Arthur G. McKee & 
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Company reported nearly identical information on the Geneva plant and the 
Fontana plant, and this lends some credence to Kaiser’s argument.147 In this case, a 
private enterprise tried to argue with the federal government to secure similar 
benefits as another private enterprise and the federal government denied the 
request. 
The War Assets Body approved the sale of the Geneva steel mill to the United 
States Steel Corporation later on May 23, 1946.  The War Assets Body chose U.S. 
Steel over the other bidders because it reduced government liability for operations 
and financing, allowed for the greatest potential of continuing use, and removed the 
government from competing with private industry.148  In fact, WAB officials thought 
the U.S. Steel bid would encourage postwar employment opportunities, foster 
private investment in the West, and assure a secure supply of steel for consumers.149  
They rejected the other bids because they specifically asked for further federal 
supervision, dollars, or involvement.  In the case of the Geneva steel plant, the 
federal intervention in the West lasted only as long the war.  Utah public opinion 
supported the sale greatly.150  Mathesius recorded that 
Thus, the Utah people, originally skeptical toward this strange 
enterprise which the war had planted in their peaceful countryside, 
are interested today in the future of steel production at Geneva and 
they are anxiously awaiting the April 1st date in the hope that a sale or 
lease of these facilities will be consummated by the government and 
that a private concern will take over, capable of doing a good job 
here.151 
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Ironically, the sale so lauded by local businesses and politicians kept the plant out of 
local control and placed it into the hands of a national corporation based in the East.  
Mathesius had built a relationship with the people of Utah and helped them to invest 
emotionally, culturally, and economically in the plant, but he could not deliver a 
truly local product.  Even management of the plant reflected the movement away 
from local control.  While under the direction of Mathesius, who remained Geneva 
Steel President until 1951, Geneva Steel Company had its headquarters in the 
Continental Building in Salt Lake City, Utah (Figure 3).  When U.S. Steel merged 
Columbia Steel and Geneva Steel into Columbia-Geneva Steel on January 1, 1951, the 
company moved its headquarters to San Francisco, California.  Thus, the highest 
authority at the Geneva plant reverted to a General Superintendent rather than a 
Company President.  Though local and regional interests celebrated the 
privatization of the Geneva plant, the consequences of having a national and Eastern 
owner would be felt during wildcat strikes of the 1950s that necessitated a 
companywide acculturation program in the 1960s, when U.S. Steel forced the plant 
to compete with other plants in the larger company structure and international 
competition, and finally ending with the closure of the Geneva plant against the 


































Geneva Steel became a tremendous influence on the Utah economy soon after 
its postwar sale to United States Steel Corporation. Geneva Steel Company and 
Columbia Iron Mining Company became the largest single employer in Utah during 
1951.152  Five thousand employees lived in Utah County alone.153  Local authorities 
and state powers considered Geneva a central icon of Utah County and the state of 
Utah. Because of the smaller size and, some would argue, more insulated nature of 
Utah’s population, Geneva Steel became an icon for the cities of Orem and Provo and 
Utah Valley.   
While a symbol of the state and valley, Geneva added much needed diversity 
to the economy of Utah.  Mathesius argued that the entire state benefited when he 
suggested that Geneva Steel’s use of Utah’s iron ore, coal, and limestone brought the 
state much closer to a balanced economy.154  Some fifteen years later, a future 
general superintendent of Geneva, George A Jedenoff, expressed concern that 
Geneva shouldered too much of the economic burden in Utah County and that the 
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valley and state needed more diversification.155  In 1950 Geneva employed 19.3 
percent of the valley’s labor force, but by 1971 that percentage had decreased to just 
under eleven percent.156  This was not due to a decrease in employment at Geneva, 
rather, the population and labor force of the valley grew in size compared to Geneva. 
Beginning with construction of the Geneva plant by U.S. Steel, the 
populations of surrounding communities increased dramatically.  Orem, home of the 
Geneva plant, saw its population rise 186.5 percent from 2,914 to 8,351 during the 
1940s.  Orem also grew by over ten thousand people in the 1950s as the growth 
from Geneva continued to influence the city.  Pleasant Grove, also very close to 
Geneva, saw its population increase by nearly sixty-five percent in the 1940s and 
nearly fifty percent in the 1950s.157  These figures can be closely attached to the 
introduction of the Geneva plant because the state as a whole grew by 9.7 percent in 
1943 while Utah County grew by 15.7 percent.  The years of 1944 – 1946 saw the 
state lose 6.7 percent of its population while Utah County experienced a net growth 
of 10.6 percent over the same years.158 
Operations at the Geneva plant created wages, salaries, and expenditures 
that radiated into the communities of Utah County.  In addition, federal dollars spent 
by U.S. Steel made an immediate impact in Utah County.  A Utah County property 
value assessment in 1942 shows a value of $43,794,215 while the 1944 valuation is 
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at $72,113,062.159  This tremendous rise in property value can only be ascribed to 
the new Geneva plant.  When the plant became private, Mathesius continued to 
increase the value of Geneva as he led the company to spend $200 million in 
upgrades.160  These upgrades ranged from a first-of-its-kind nitrogen plant to 
improved production facilities.161 Later during the early 1970s, Geneva wages and 
salaries directly influenced forty percent of all income, thirty percent of all 
nonagricultural jobs, and contributed twelve percent of all property taxes within 
Utah County.162  Even members of the First Presidency of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints expressed that the church had a stake in the success of Geneva 
as there were tithing donations and missionary funds that relied on the wages and 
salaries of Geneva employees.163  These economic data clearly show that the Geneva 
plant fundamentally altered the economics of Utah Valley and that its influence only 
dimmed during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  These economic changes, however, 
have been carefully addressed by other historians. 164  The lingering cultural 
changes created by the processes involving the Geneva plant may be less readily 
apparent and deserve greater attention.
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The Geneva plant created change in the cultural attitudes of Utah Valley 
residents because of its unique setting in which local attitudes about the plant, their 
labor, and its place in Utah Valley adjusted to federal, Eastern, and local influences.  
Even though ownership of the plant changed only twice, from federal to private and 
later to another private company, locals perceived that the plant and their economic 
livers were controlled by federal, Eastern, and local forces in at least five separate 
iterations: first as a federal project (1941-1945), second as an Eastern corporation 
project (1945-1963), thirdly as a local plant that happened to be part of an Eastern 
corporation (1963-1979), fourthly as an ignored part of an Eastern corporation 
(1979-1986), and fifthly as a local business (1986-2002).  Locals also responded to 
efforts by Geneva plant management and local authorities by changing their 
relationship to the plant from skeptics to supporters, scorned owners, and finally to 
a cultural identification with an iconic plant that marred the local landscape and air.  
Throughout all the cultural adjustments, the leadership of the LDS church 
consistently expressed interest and support for the plant, its operations, and at 
various points took significant actions to influence local perception of the plant.165   
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Members of the LDS faith initially feared the cultural impact of out-of-state 
employees and a federal operation and how it might change the moral standards of 
the valley.  Mormons in Utah County and across the state also strongly identified 
with agriculture and worried about the influence of industry on their identity and 
economic status. As the first decades of Geneva progressed, they recognized the 
economic benefits and experienced responsive and outgoing corporate policies; 
Utah County citizens warmed up to Geneva.  In the mid-1960s, through a program 
built to increase efficiency, Errors Zero, local employees and other neighbors to 
Geneva more thoroughly integrated the Geneva plant into their community and 
began to recognize the plant as ‘theirs’ (almost synonymous with BYU) rather than 
part of an Eastern corporation.166  Eventually, locals would come to see Geneva as a 
primary symbol of Utah County and recognize it as a prominent part of the character 
and culture.  Locals grew and expressed an attachment to the plant beyond the 
economic facts of the 1970s and 1980s.  Even though its economic impact lessened 
as the county grew in size and economic diversity, locals feared losing Geneva while 
they complained about the pollution, smell, and appearance of ‘their’ plant.   
Mathesius’ change from a skeptical outsider to a welcome insider mirrors the 
changes to perceptions of the Geneva steel mill over the course of its first decade in 
Utah.  Early in the process of building Geneva, the plant may have seemed foreign 
and frightening to some local powers.  They were concerned with the economic 
impact and social changes brought by the federally directed plant.  As Alexander 
points out, Utah culture changed during the war years as federal projects increased 
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social dislocation and Utahn’s experienced increased divorce rates and crime 
rates.167  Later, however, many of these fears abated due to the influence of jobs, 
money, and the beneficial economic impact on the valley. 
Walther Mathesius thought that although he needed the community’s 
cooperation to succeed at Geneva, the federal government did not design the Geneva 
plant to address any economic, employment, social, or political needs of Utah 
County or the state of Utah, but solely to address the ongoing war effort and national 
steel production issues.168  While initially ignoring local concerns about agriculture 
vs. industrial, in his postwar years as Geneva president, Mathesius took every 
opportunity he could to speak to local communities about his vision for the 
relationship between Geneva Steel and the local and state economics. Mathesius 
tried to convince locals that Geneva had created the foundation for a new 
development in Utah that would keep younger people from leaving the state to seek 
higher wages and stable employment.169  He argued that industrial development 
that supported the local social and cultural standards created jobs, injected payroll 
money into the community, and paid taxes; it also stimulated agricultural 
endeavors.170  The dramatic increase in employment after the war served 
Mathesius’ purposes as he often pointed out that in 1950, there were 5,000 more 
industrial jobs and 2,000 more agricultural jobs in Utah County than in 1940.171  
According to a later superintendent, nearly 100,000 Utahns came to depend on 
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Geneva Steel for their economic welfare.172  Mathesius is this thesis’ primary source 
for information about the early connections between the plant and the local 
population, which may be a weakness, but the argument that Geneva changed Utah 
valley culture and economics hinges on scale rather than reality.  In scale, the author 
considers Mathesius very accurate due to newspaper and census records that 
support his arguments. 
Beyond Utah Valley culture and economics, Mathesius and Geneva made an 
impact in personal terms with LDS leadership and state political powers.  Mathesius 
retired from Geneva Steel Company in 1951 and some of the brightest luminaries in 
Utah political, economic, and religious life attended his farewell banquet at the Alta 
Club in Salt Lake City.173  Over a dinner of broiled New York Cut Steak aux 
champignon and frozen peppermint cake, among other things, people such as David 
O. Mckay, President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, five other LDS 
apostles, and other leaders such as Ray Olpin and Ernest L Wilkinson mixed and 
mingled to honor Geneva Steel Company’s outgoing president.174  J. Reuben Clark, a 
senior apostle of the LDS church, continued his connection with the Mathesius’ by 
maintaining correspondence for many years and benefitting from birthday letters 
and gifts of musical recordings from the Mathesius’.175  Even in1958, seven years 
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after they moved back to Geneva, Illinois, the Mathesius’ managed to attend Clark’s 
80th birthday in Grantsville, Utah.176   
Mathesius’ legacy of involvement with the LDS church lasted the entire life of 
the Geneva plant.  Officials with U.S. Steel in Utah considered the involvement of the 
LDS Church and First Presidency, specifically, essential to the success of Geneva, and 
recognized that they gave the plant unqualified support.177  N. Eldon Tanner, 
member of the First Presidency, spoke at the kickoff of the “Errors Zero” program in 
1965 and was “absolutely vital” to the program.178  In 1985, when U.S. Steel 
announced their intention to close the plant, public relations officers of U.S. Steel 
met with the First Presidency immediately after meeting with Governor Norm 
Bangerter and before meeting with the press, saying that “anything they wanted to 
know about Geneva, they were told.”179 In 1988, when LDS authorities called Louis 
Ringger, Assistant to the General Superintendent at the Geneva plant, to serve as a 
temple worker in the Provo Temple, he recalled Elder Gordon B. Hinckley asking 
him whether he could leave Geneva “without hurting the plant.”180 
David Bigler’s thirty-five year employment at Geneva illustrates an example 
of Mathesius’ suggestion that locals would remain in-state to secure employment, a 
substantial change to the economics and culture of Utah.  Bigler graduated from the 
University of Utah in 1950 with a degree in Journalism and decided to seek 
employment in-state because of the opportunities at Geneva Steel.  He began with 
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Geneva Steel Company and wrote to Loren Westhaver, then an executive Vice 
President.  Westhaver offered him a position in marketing with U.S. Steel.  At the 
same time, however, Bigler’s father, a dairyman in West Jordan, was pursuing a case 
against Geneva because the fluoride emissions from the plant had ruined the teeth 
of his dairy cattle.181  Bigler recalled meetings where executives described the 
farmers pursuing legal cases as greedy, but upon recognizing him in the room they 
mentioned that some probably had honest cases.  Bigler’s father won his case and 
received compensation for his losses, but this did not keep his son from eventually 
achieving the top Public Relations position for U.S. Steel in Salt Lake City.182  Without 
the opportunity to work for Geneva, David Bigler may have sought employment out 
of state, something Mathesius recognized early on during his time in Utah.  Bigler 
argued that Geneva brought a higher standard of living to Utah County and the state 
of Utah as a whole – putting food on the table and providing education for young 
people.183  His family experienced some of the negative effects of Geneva – the 
fluoride emissions that injured cattle – but seemed to be proud that their son 
worked for Geneva.184 
Val Oveson, Lieutenant Governor of Utah, grew up in the shadows of the 
Geneva plant where his father worked as a rolling mill foreman, and exemplifies the 
experience of the second generation of Utahns connected to Geneva.  Oveson’s 
father, Wilford, originally came to Utah Valley in the 1920s to pursue a bachelor’s 
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degree from Brigham Young University.  After dropping out of BYU and working at 
the Ironton plant, he began work on Geneva as a swing-shift batch-plant foreman 
making cement for the construction of the Geneva plant.185  He later changed his 
position to begin work at the rolling mill in 1944 when construction finished.  
Wilford Oveson retired in January 1973 and ended up one of the most senior 
employees in the Rolling Mill.  The thirty years of work allowed his family the 
security and income to live a good life, according to Val Oveson.  He argued that 
many of the employees at Geneva had small farms or a few acres that they tended 
while not at Geneva.  Oveson thought that these employees, including his father, 
may have intended Geneva to supplement their income from the farms, but then 
Geneva became the primary source of income.186  While Oveson recalled the steady 
income as valuable, he also remembered being embarrassed that his father worked 
at the mill rather than in a profession such as Doctor, Lawyer, or Professor at BYU.  
Val Oveson recalled asking his mother “Where is Dad today?” and finding out that 
“He is working Saturday to change knives.”187  Those knives were the tools that cut 
the steel at the rolling mill and, according to Oveson, it was dirty and greasy work.  
On those days his father would shower at the plant and come home from work 
clean; something he noted was highly unusual.  The irony, however, was that 
Oveson’s first time through the gates of Geneva Steel, in 1984 while campaigning for 
Lt. Governor, came nearly one year after his father passed away.  He toured the 
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facilities and saw the place his father worked to supervise the rolling mill and broke 
down emotionally at seeing where his father had spent so much of his life.188 
Local perception of the Geneva plant went from federal economic boon to a 
beloved but outdated environmental hazard in a cultural process that synthesized 
local attitudes and corporate policies.  Geneva experienced the pinnacle of public 
sentiment during the war years and in the 1950s.  But the next five decades saw 
forces of management, international competition, and environmental awareness 
erode fiscal and filial loyalty towards the Geneva plant and its eventual demise as a 
functioning steel mill.  The primary cause for the end of operations at the Geneva 
plant, however, came from the transportation and market issues associated with is 
placement in Utah. 
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DECLINE IN SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS 
 
 
 From the beginnings of the Geneva plant, federal employees and others 
associated with the decision to build in Utah noted that successful operation of the 
plant depended on competitive transportation costs and increasing market demand.  
While the raw materials for an integrated steel mill were more centralized than any 
other integrated steel mill, the distance to decisive markets was greater than any 
other integrated steel mill.  Located nearly a thousand miles or more from either the 
Pacific or Atlantic coast, Geneva executives understood that their products had to 
travel on railroad lines that cost more than water transportation near plants on the 
Great Lakes or Pacific Coast.  Without a competitive price on shipping, Geneva 
products would cost more to consumers than other national or international 
products.   
Operations at the Geneva plant during the Second World War were 
unaffected by shipping rate issues, but privatization made shipping rates a primary 
factor in operational success.  During the Second World War, WPB officials did not 
allow shipping costs to limit the operations at the Geneva plant.  Rather, they 
believed demand for steel in shipbuilding and other wartime efforts outweighed the 
cost of supply via railroad.   Federal officials and U.S. Steel executives operated the 
plant on a wartime footing and as mentioned above, did not consider postwar 





the plant after the war, it became a private institution subject to market forces of 
supply and demand and consumers that did not react favorably to overpriced 
commodities.  Base railroad shipping rates did not cause the cost of Geneva steel 
products to rise to uncompetitive prices.  Western railroad executives initially 
provided favorable shipping rates and these prices never became exorbitant in 
nature.189  Starting in 1959, however, shipping rates became a serious competitive 
issue when international imports arrived via the Pacific Ocean at much lower 
shipping costs. 
While WPB officials did not consider shipping rates a decisive factor, federal 
planners appreciated the relatively equidistant location of the Geneva plant from 
major shipbuilding centers in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Portland.190  They 
rightly considered that they should locate the war plant in the best place to serve 
war demand, and that was in a central location like Utah.  This focus on war demand, 
however, did not account for peacetime demand nor the fact that future Geneva 
plant operators would have to access these distant steel markets via railroad rather 
than less expensive water transportation.  Prior to 1933, according to Alexander, 
industries in Utah performed the primary processing on Utah’s coal and iron ore 
resources only to ship it East for eastern corporations to finish and ship back as 
batteries, motors, and coins.191 Because of this outsourcing of product finishing, U.S. 
Steel executives did not consider Utah a major steel market, although industries 
later relocated near Geneva as a natural result of having cheap, local access to steel.  
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One of these companies, EIMCO, owned and operated by Joseph Rosenblatt, used 
Geneva as their primary source of steel and would have been less competitive had 
they not had a local steel producer like Geneva.192  Regardless of local benefits, U.S. 
Steel executives did not consider any Geneva products fit for consumption in the 
Eastern half of the United States.  The Geneva plant production belonged to the 
Western United States almost exclusively, and thus had to compete on the Pacific 
Coast with domestic and international steel producers who had less expensive and 
closer access to steel markets. 
The first element of erosion in competition and popularity came with Geneva 
Steel Company’s change in focus from more efficient and effective technology to 
increased corporate control of labor and production standards.  While Geneva had 
some of the best technology and manufacturing processes, including the first strip 
mill in the world with speed regulators and automatic thickness control (something 
German steel engineers wanted to emulate in the early 1950s), U.S. Steel executives 
chose to focus on labor efficiency.193  The best example of this change of focus 
occurred during the 1960s and the administration of General Superintendent 
George A. Jedenoff.  Geneva Steel management began a communications campaign in 
1966 called “Errors Zero” that built on an idea used at the Defense Department to 
reduce production errors.194  Jedenoff designed the plan to increase labor loyalty 
and operations efficiency by helping workers see the Geneva plant as ‘local’ plant 
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rather than an Eastern corporate plant, while at the same time decreasing the 
number of wildcat strikes and slowdowns while reducing the number of 
employees.195  Jedenoff believed that the numbers of wildcat strikes at Geneva were 
too high at nearly 6.6 per year, a record for any U.S. Steel plant, and that Geneva’s 
reputation for strikes and slowdowns hurt business.196  Jedenoff also designed the 
communications plan in response to lower profits caused by increased domestic and 
international competition, particularly from Japan.  According to David Bigler, the 
lack of leadership during the post-Mathesius era led to aggressive and negative 
union leadership that was influenced inordinately by national interests.197 Bigler 
argued that Jedenoff brought corporate and union interests back together and into 
greater cooperation.  
While other plants responded with modernization efforts, Kaiser invested 
$119 million in renovations and Bethlehem put new San Francisco finishing 
facilities on the fast track, Geneva Steel decided to pursue stricter control of 
production and labor.198  Jedenoff thought that Errors Zero would increase labor’s 
performance to a superior level which would be able to counter the distance to 
market advantage held by domestic steel producers and Japanese steel mills.199  The 
greater efficiency reached by employees at Geneva may have alleviated some short-
term problems, but did not address the basic issues of cost, shipping costs, and 
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access to markets.  These issues would continue to plague U.S. Steel’s operations at 
the Geneva plant for two more decades. 
The second element causing Geneva to lose primacy in Utah County was the 
result of international competition in the steel market and the decreased 
competitiveness of Geneva during the 1970s and 1980s.  According to Jedenoff, the 
U.S. steel industry lost over 70,000 jobs in just one year due to eleven million tons of 
foreign imported steel.200  During the 1960s and 1970s much of these imports came 
from Japanese and later Korean steel mills.  Jedenoff argued that the lower 
employment costs abroad and lower shipping rates due to deep water ports allowed 
Japanese steel products to cost thirty to thirty-five dollars less per ton than Geneva 
steel products.201  Geneva management also cited a lack of governmental support for 
the steel industry during the 1970s as another issue that compounded foreign 
competition.  Mathesius had noted this process as early as 1951 and described it 
thus:  
Malcontents, misfits, idealistic dreamers, free-wheeling economic 
tinkerers, and politicians intent on their purpose with slight regard 
for the true facts hold the industry up to scorn as a greedy monster, 
deviously striving to enrich itself at the expense of the country’s 
welfare, the prototype of all that a large section of our uniformed 
public still believes to be bad in all ‘big business’, a horrible product of 
the ‘free enterprise’ system, which must be chained and restricted and 
taxed, lest it wreck the country’s economy.202 
 
Mathesius, of course, wrote from the perspective of a steel industry manager, but his 
assessments appear prophetic when considering the public’s feelings toward the 
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steel industry during the 1970s and 1980s.  Ringger believed that the government 
interfered with steel in three important ways: the first was when President Harry S. 
Truman “took over the plants” in the 1950s, the second was the inflationary spiral of 
the 1970s, and finally the federal government introduced cost of living adjustment 
regulations.203 
 The third major reason for Geneva’s decline came from a greater sense of 
environmental awareness in federal actions and community standards and the 
inability of Geneva Steel to match those standards in actual fact and especially in the 
public mind.  From the beginning of operations at the Geneva plant, managers 
attempted to mollify environmental concerns within the community.  At first, it was 
mainly an issue of working with agricultural interests to assure them that the plant 
would not harm their crops and that the plant was ‘clean’ in the sense of orderly, 
neat, and not dirty.  Geneva plant managers recognized that they needed to take 
certain measures to maintain a high quality of life in the surrounding area.  This and 
Mathesius’ prior emphasis on good relations with agriculture interests led to the 
creation of an experimental agricultural farm in 1953.  Scientists employed by 
Geneva Steel researched, among other things, the effects of fluoride on over one 
hundred-fifty varieties of crops.204 
 Modern environmental concerns, however, came to the fore in Utah Valley 
during the early 1980s and challenged Geneva Steel management, especially after its 
reopening in 1987, to match the growing expectation of clean air, clean water, and 
less inversion.  While early speeches and records of Walther Mathesius give little 
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indication of a specific concern for environmental issues in the modern sense, much 
of the later literature produced by Geneva Steel emphasizes a historical 
environmental sensitivity.  U.S. Steel recognized the growing concern for the 
environment in a 1978 publication titled “Geneva and our Environment” in which 
the corporation attempted to allay fears of the plant being an uncontrolled pollution 
producer.205  “A Brief History of Geneva Steel,” written in 1990 by Geneva Steel 
public relations, attempts to emphasize that environmental consciousness was a 
high priority, more so than federal involvement or labor relations.  It lists the 
improvements made for environmental reasons, including gas cleaning facilities, 
waste oil recovery facilities, and open hearth precipitators.206  Bigler suggested that 
Geneva executives were so advanced with their environmental efforts that they had 
to explain their expenditures to U.S. Steel executives in Pittsburgh by using the 
“Mormon Mystery” card: they had to do things a little different in ‘Mormon 
Country’.207  He went on to suggest that Geneva executives “played that theme over 
and over.”208  The executives at U.S. Steel, according to Bigler, were just too slow to 
realize that environmental issues would be significant challenges to the company.  
He argued that the environment “really clobbered” the company and that the 
company should have upgraded sooner because cleaner facilities meant more 
efficient facilities which then meant a more competitive product.209 
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It the early 1990s public angst about Geneva Steel’s air pollution and the 
infamous Utah inversions made headlines nearly every week in both Utah County 
papers and state-wide papers.  The public blamed Geneva Steel for foul smells, the 
destruction of Utah Lake, winter inversion, and health issues.210  Geneva Steel 
executives, however, argued that they were modernizing the plant and that Utah 
County is a natural basin for inversion during the winter and that automobile traffic 
was the most to blame.211  The divide went so far as to argue whether children’s 
pulmonary illnesses resulted from RSV or particulates emanating from Geneva 
Steel’s smokestacks.212 
Operations at the Geneva plant ended in 2002 after owners experienced a 
slow decline in profitability and popularity.  U.S. Steel integrated two subsidiaries, 
Columbia Steel and Geneva Steel, during the 1950s and moved the company 
headquarters to San Francisco.  Local operations then became the responsibility of 
the General Superintendent rather than the President of the company.  The 
combination of poor management choices, international competition, and 
environmental concerns combined to end operations at the Geneva Steel plant in 
both 1986 and 2002.  In 1986, as a result of a nationwide strike by steel workers, 
U.S. Steel executives chose to close the Geneva plant.  At that time it needed roughly 
one billion dollars in modernization to successfully compete with foreign steel 
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imports.213  Rather than spend the money to upgrade an aging and uncompetitive 
steel mill, U.S. Steel executives chose to close the operations in Utah and move steel 
production to Pittsburg, California using Korean steel.214  U.S. Steel officials closed 
the Geneva plant and ended operations on August 31, 1986.  Pundits and Politicians 
feared that closure of the Geneva plant would further collapse the Utah economy.  
Lt. Governor Oveson noted that the Kennecott mine had already closed, oil prices 
were abnormally low, and that the Utah economy needed a rescue.  Oveson pointed 
to officials at Basic Manufacturing & Technologies who purchased the plant and 
reopened it September 1, 1987 as those rescuers.  This company, owned by local 
attorneys Joseph Cannon and Robert Grow, attempted to use the $44 million 
purchase price and over $354 million in restoration and upgrades to make the plant 
a local success story.   
These ‘local heroes’, as the company history described them, attempted to 
make Geneva last into the next millennia, but could not overcome the same 
pressures of international competition, upgrade costs, and even more intense 
environmental pressures (Figure 4).215  In addition, the plant could not compete 
with international steel and regional ‘mini-mills’ that could underprice them in 
markets that cost too much to reach.  After undergoing bankruptcy and shutting 
down in 2002, backhoes and explosives brought the Geneva plant to the ground in 
2005.  As it turned out, the economic future of Utah did not rest on the Geneva plant 
as much as Oveson and others imagined.  The state unemployment numbers were at  
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a new decade-low during the year Geneva sat silent.216  Also, a simple study in 1990 
suggested that while neither retail sales nor new construction suffered from the 
shutdown, the presence of Geneva’s air pollution and facilities deterred economic 
growth in Utah County.217  It appears that Utah County and Utah simply outgrew the 
Geneva plant and no longer relied on it as a job creator, job diversifier, and 
economic weather vane.  Orem and Provo, particularly, had become centers for high 
tech companies (such as Novell, WordPerfect, and Signetics), a diversified service 
sector, and a population that no longer needed Geneva employment in order to 
thrive economically.218  Utah Valley businesses and cities moved away from an 
economic reliance on Geneva and this suggests that local powers that once had to 
adapt to the introduction of the federal project now could sustain economic vitality 
without its continued presence. 
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The construction, operation, and sale of the Geneva steel works constituted a 
tremendous federal investment in material, manpower, and industry for the county 
and state of Utah.  Of the $60 billion spent by the federal Government in the 
American West, a significant portion crossed into Utah and changed Utah County 
from an agricultural appendage of Salt Lake City to a central dynamo of industry 
along the Wasatch Front.219  Federal officials at the RFC and DPC recommended 
expanded steel production in the West in response to national defense requirements 
and after recognizing that the Panama Canal, a central shipping point for eastern 
steel, could close during hostilities.  They chose Utah as the location for the largest 
integrated steel mill west of the Mississippi because of its proximity to coal, iron ore, 
and other raw materials as well as its central location in relation to West Coast 
ports. 
 Yet, the effort to construct and operate the Geneva plant forced federal, 
regional, and local powers to interact in multifaceted ways.  Executives at Columbia 
Steel, a regional company prior to its purchase by U.S. Steel, built on early Mormon 
efforts to produce pig iron.  They used their own funding to discover a more 
effective technique for using Utah coal the proved significant in suggesting a 
federally organized integrated steel mill could use local coal.  Congressional leaders 
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of Utah advocated for the plant and local leaders debated the best locations and how 
to use the plant to improve economic conditions in Utah County.  Construction and 
operation of the Geneva plant also forced local culture and economics to adapt to a 
new federal plant and later Eastern corporation plant.  The changes in perception 
followed a trajectory that echoed fears of federal involvement, gratitude for work 
and economic growth, alienation by an Eastern corporation, and later enthusiasm 
for ‘local heroes’ and a local business. 
Privatization set the Geneva plant on a course that could not overcome its 
inherent economic weaknesses.  U.S. Steel purchased the plant from the Federal 
Government and for nearly ten years allowed a local subsidiary to operate the plant.  
Then in the 1950s, a merger between Geneva Steel and Columbia Steel moved 
management further away from Utah County.  Later efforts to overcome 
international competition by controlling labor sowed seeds that operators in the 
1980s reaped as antiquated and inefficient facilities.  Environmental sensitivity also 
put pressure on management at U.S. Steel and Basic Manufacturing & Technologies 
and turned the relationship of the Geneva plant and local community inside out – 
from federal gift to local eyesore. 
While the history of the Geneva plant plainly fits into some of our historical 
categories, the careful analysis in this thesis also gives us new insights into our 
understanding of the West.  The implications for Turner’s thesis on the Geneva plant 
lies with the early history European settlement in Utah.  The frontier encompassed 
Utah at one point and through the processes of the frontier, its citizens overcame its 





ideal American: democratic, self-reliant, and independent.  Prior to Geneva, Utah 
Valley residents primarily relied on agriculture and Turner’s ideals of self-reliance 
and independence.   
DeVoto might place this change from agriculture to industry in terms of the 
Eastern dominance of a colony.  The raw resources in Utah would go to the Geneva 
plant to be changed into commodities that an Eastern company, U.S. Steel, would use 
for profits without returning investments to the source of profit, Utah.  While 
DeVoto would characterize Utah as a colony, entirely dependent on the East, this 
thesis points out that local and regional forces had used the resources in Utah for 
nearly eighty years prior to construction of the Geneva plant.  Some of these efforts 
were more successful than others; Columbia Steel is an example of success.  DeVoto, 
however, would then go on to explain that since Columbia Steel executives accepted 
a buyout offer from U.S. Steel, they became part of the colonial process.  DeVoto 
would also suggest that the “Errors Zero” program tried to hide the colonial status 
of Geneva and its employees.  He would point out that the program varnished over 
the fact that the Geneva plant belonged to an Eastern corporation and trying to 
make employees believe in a Utah Geneva plant that somehow answered to local 
issues rather than eastern corporate demands was simply delaying the inevitable. 
The inevitable happened when U.S. Steel closed the plant.  Eastern dominance of 
Utah’s steel industry continued until 1986 when Basic Manufacturing & Technology, 
a local Utah company, purchased the plant.   
Nash has had the most to say in this thesis because he argues that federal 





West’s economics, culture, and character.  Since the federal government acted as the 
primary instigator for the Geneva plant, it makes sense to consider Nash’s ideas.  
This thesis agrees that the federal government made significant changes to the West 
and that this happened in conjunction with private enterprise.  Where this thesis 
disagrees with Nash is on the prewar nature of industry and enterprise.  Federal 
officials would not have chosen Utah for an integrated steel mill if previous industry 
had not proven that Utah coal could be successfully modified to serve in steel 
production.   While industry in the West did not compare in size or density to 
Eastern industry, it did make significant progress.  Igler argues forcefully that 
Western industry did not take the same shape as Eastern industry, but proved vital 
to future industrial growth. 
Alexander makes a compelling argument for the transition of Utah from one 
colonial master to another that synthesizes both Nash and DeVoto.  The Geneva 
plant, however, complicates the issue by changing from federal hands to private 
hands relatively early in his ‘new colonial empire’ history.  U. S. Steel depended on 
federal intervention as much as any other large national corporation, but its 
primacy over the Geneva plant suggests that Geneva was a holdout of the ‘old 
colonial empire’ where primary resources were processed, but shipped to other 
states for refinement.  Given that the ‘old colonial empire’ did not leave Utah with 
finishing industries or a decisive market for these goods, it makes sense that Geneva 
sent most of its product to Pittsburg, California for final processing.   The possibility 
that the two empires, Wall Street and Washington, provided a diverse enough 





answer to why Orem did not become a “rust belt” city.  Alexander and Nash might 
agree that when Geneva finally sold to local owners in 1986 that any ‘colonization’ 
of Geneva finally came to an end. 
 New Western historians might consider the story of the Geneva plant as 
another chapter in the dominance of larger federal projects in the lives of 
Westerners.  At that point in history, there probably would have been little chance 
for people in Utah County to protest, change, or alter the plans of the federal 
government.  Their best option in response to federal efforts came from adaptation 
and acceptance rather than resistance.  In this way, the Geneva steel plant 
‘conquered’ Utah Valley and changed the direction of the valley for many decades to 
come. 220  The most heinous consequences came later in the 1980s and 1990s as 
economic uncertainty and environmental pollution raised the ire of concerned 
citizens, but in the 1940s the valley probably thought it got quite a catch.  Similarly 
to a hydraulic society, Utah County initially came to depend on the federal project 
and became subject to the dictates of its management. This lasted until population 
and economic growth in Utah County and Utah made the Geneva plant employee’s 
wages, salaries, and life style only a small fraction of the sum. 
 The history of the Geneva plant presents historians with an example of 
Western history that includes many of the elements argued by prominent historians 
but suggests that local power is an essential factor in the consideration of the 
federal and private West.  The often contradictory and sometimes complementary 
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forces of federal involvement and private work forged a unique industrial landscape 
due to the influence of local powers on the shores of Utah Lake.  As Nash argues, 
neither federal nor private entities would have built the Geneva plant without each 
other’s efforts.  Federal dollars of the Defense Plant Corporation, for example, or a 
private organization to operate it duirng the war, such as the United States Steel 
Corporation, are examples of such efforts. Igler for example, would note that the 
employees of the Columbia Steel Company, a private company based in the West, 
developed the iron ore and coal resources of Utah and the technology to use them 
properly.  But Columbia executives did not have the capital to build an integrated 
steel mill as large as the Geneva plant.  Their efforts, however, made it possible for 
the federal government to build the Geneva plant in Utah for the federal war 
program.221  W.A. Hauck, consultant for the Steel Unit Division of the Office of 
Production Management, and Jesse Jones, the head of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, made essential recommendations and choices that led to the Geneva 
plant’s construction in Utah.222  The private owners of the Columbia Steel Company 
and other local industrialists also made recommendations and choices about 
industry in Utah that enabled the federal investment necessary to use Utah’s 
resources.  During the postwar operations, local residents adapted to the Eastern 
corporation at Geneva presence by first staging wildcat strikes, then by allowing 
themselves to be co-opted into the “Errors Zero” program.  Jedenoff used this 
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program to help employees and locals to see the plant as ‘theirs’ and adapt an ‘us 
versus the world’ mentality that successfully subsumed the Eastern identity of the 
plant.  This identity stuck so well that when U.S. Steel began suggesting that Geneva 
might close, locals rallied to ‘their’ plant and strongly disagreed with any closure 
program.  Local residents and businesses enjoyed the change in the colonization or 
federal presence in Utah when local lawyers bought and operated the Geneva plant 
in 1987.  In reality though, the plant, by then a Utah Valley icon, had more symbolic 
than economic value and experienced much less agitation when it closed in 2002.  
The explosive charges and bulldozers that brought down the buildings at Geneva 
ended a nearly seven-decade long experience of federal intervention, Eastern 
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